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 Executive Summary 
 
In this paper we show that omitted variables and publication bias lead to severely biased 
estimates of the value of a statistical life.  Although our empirical results are obtained in the 
context of a study of choices about road safety, we suspect that the same issues plague the 
estimation of monetary trade-offs regarding safety in other contexts.   
   1
Estimating the Value of a Statistical Life: The Importance of Omitted Variables and 
Publication Bias 
 




Measures of public preferences toward risk are critical to evaluations of public policies 
on many safety, environmental, and health issues. In this paper we provide a method for 
measuring the revealed preferences for safety risks from state level public choices about speed 
limits. The idea is to measure the value of the time saved per incremental fatality that results 
from the voluntary adoption of an increased speed limit. Since adopters must have valued the 
time saved by greater speeds more than the fatalities created, this ratio provides a convincing and 
credible upper bound on the value of a statistical life (VSL).
1   
Although there have been a number of creative attempts designed to estimate the value of 
a statistical life, there have been few opportunities to obtain estimates based on the public’s 
willingness to accept an exogenous and known safety risk and to do this for multiple independent 
decision makers.
2  The empirical analysis we report here exploits the opportunity that the federal 
government gave the states in 1987 to choose a speed limit for rural interstate highways that was 
higher than the uniform national maximum speed limit then in existence. 
  This institutional change allows us to address two key conceptual problems that have 
plagued previous attempts to estimate the VSL.  First, most methods for assessing the VSL from 
labor market data are not based on choices made in the face of exogenous safety risks.  This 
results in estimates of the VSL that often are not based on credible identification assumptions or 
suffer from serious potential omitted variables bias.
3  For example, we demonstrate that 
conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation indicates that speeds and highway fatality 
rates are uncorrelated, presumably due to drivers’ optimizing decisions.  To avoid this problem 
of omitted variables, we use states’ decisions about adopting a higher speed limit in response to 
the 1987 law as an instrumental variable (IV).  In sharp contrast to the OLS results, this IV 
                                                           
1 This paper is an extension of Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004), which explains a number of related issues in 
greater detail.  
2 For useful, detailed surveys see Viscusi (1993) and Blomquist (2001).  
3 See especially Black and Kniesner (2003).   2
estimation strategy indicates that speeds and fatalities are highly correlated and that adopters 
received approximately $1.5 million (1997$) per marginal fatality.   
Second, our estimates of the tradeoff between the value of time saved and fatalities can 
be made from comparisons of rural interstates and other highways within states that adopted 
increased speeds, as well as from comparisons with roads in non-adopting states.  This statistical 
design permits us to obtain separate estimates of this tradeoff for each of the states with complete 
data that changed speed limits.  Consequently, we can also examine how “publication bias” 
might lead to “consensus” estimates of the VSL being determined by a selected sample of the 
estimated tradeoffs.  Since only “successful” analyses are likely to be published, we implement 
several of the most likely “publication rules” and show that the consensus estimate is likely to be 
significantly upward biased by publication bias.
4 
 
2. Design of the Study 
 
The first U.S. laws imposing restrictive speed limits on motor vehicles were passed in 
1901 in Connecticut.  With the exception of a Second World War emergency limit of 35 mph, 
the setting of speed limits remained the responsibility of the state and local governments until 
1974 when Congress enacted the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act. This bill, 
intended as a fuel conservation measure, required, among other things, a national maximum 
speed limit of 55 mph.  This new national speed limit was lower than the existing maximum 
daytime speed limit in all 50 states. 
The Federal Highway Administration was empowered to enforce the new speed limit by 
the use of financial sanctions.  By 1987 dissatisfaction with the federally imposed (and enforced) 
national maximum speed limit led Congress to modify the law to permit states to set speed limits 
of 65 mph on rural interstate highways only.  Forty states immediately exercised this option.  
Even with the end of the concern for fuel conservation, the national maximum speed limit was 
retained in some form until repeal in 1995.  By the end of 1997 only three states maintained a 55 
mph speed limit on rural interstates: 20 states had rural interstate speed limits of 65 mph, 16 were 
                                                           
4 There are easily implemented econometric methods for use with meta-analyses of multiple studies of the VSL to 
test and correct for publication bias problems.  See Hedges (1992) and Ashenfelter, Harmon and Oosterbeek (1999).   3
at 70 mph, 10 at 75 mph, and Montana had no daytime speed limit, returning to its policy in 
1973.  
In this paper we study 21 of the 40 states that chose to raise their speed limits to 65 miles 
per hour on rural interstate highways by 1988.  The remaining states had no rural interstate 
highways (3), did not change their speed limit (7), or were states for which we could not obtain 
reliable data (19).  Uniform and reliable data on the post-1995 period is unavailable at this time, 
but we hope to extend our analysis to this period when possible. 
Our operating hypothesis is that the legislative decisions about speed limits can be used 
to infer the VSL of an individual whose preferences are important for maximizing societal 
welfare.  This requires that: (a) lawmakers were aware of the tradeoffs associated with a higher 
speed limit; and, (b) the legislators’ adoption decisions reflect the preferences of a driver/voter 
toward the center of the distribution of preferences 
We find both of these assumptions plausible.  First, there was considerable evidence 
available to legislators in 1987 on the effects of higher speed limits on average speeds and 
fatality rates.  Importantly, this evidence was collected and summarized in a widely disseminated 
report by the National Research Council (NRC 1984).  Second, there is ample anecdotal 
evidence that in choosing a speed limit states aim to maximize societal welfare.  For example, an 
Indiana Department of Transportation report states: 
 
Speed limits represent trade-offs between risk and travel time for a road 
class or specific highway section reflecting an appropriate balance 
between the societal goals of safety and mobility.  The process of setting 
speed limits is not merely a technical exercise.  It involves value 
judgments and trade-offs that are in the arena of the political process 
[italics added] (Khan, Sinha, and McCarthy, 2000, p. 144). 
 
Further, one might expect that if the 1987 adoption decisions were in conflict with driver/voter 
preferences that states would reverse their decisions over time.  Notably, none of the states 
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3.  What is Being Measured? 
 
Assuming that decisions to increase speed limits reflect informed voter preferences, there 
still remains the question of what part of the distribution of preferences is measured by our 
empirical analysis.  To study this problem, it is essential to distinguish between (a) the technical 
constraint that connects speeds to fatalities and (b) the preferences of voters as between speed 
and fatality risks.  We may observe the technical constraint, but we can only infer voter/driver 
preferences from their choices.   
To understand the issues, suppose the median driver/voter in state i is offered the 
opportunity to increase the speed limit from Si to Si’ through the political process.  Associated 
with this offer is a decrease in the cost of travel time of w∆hi, which is measured as the product 
of the value of time (w, the wage) and the amount of time saved (measured in hours, h).  Also 
associated with this offer is an increase in the fatality rate (f) of ∆fi, so that we may display the 
heterogeneity in this offer by writing 
(1)  Vi = -w(∆hi/∆fi). 
The left hand side of equation (1) is a discrete measure of the value of time saved (V) as a result 
of the speed limit change.  We use the 1987 law to estimate the Vi’s, as well as their mean.    
The value of a statistical life, Vi*, reflects the preferences toward safety (the rate of 
substitution between money and risk) of the determining driver/voter in state i.
5  A higher speed 
limit will be adopted if Vi > Vi*, for in this case the time costs saved by the increased speeds that 
result from the higher speed limit will be greater per fatality than the value of the determining 
statistical life, Vi*.  The probability that the higher speed limit is adopted is thus: 
  (2)    Pr (Adoption) = Pr (Vi > Vi*). 
  It is apparent from (2) that the average value of Vi amongst adopters, E(Vi|Adoption) = 
E(Vi|Vi>Vi*), must be at least as great as E(Vi*|Adoption), the average value of a statistical life 
among adopters.  Thus, the measured average value of time costs saved per marginal fatality 
from the adoption of an increased speed limit is generally greater than the mean value of a 
statistical life among adopters and provides an upper bound on that quantity.  In addition in the 
special case where the value of a statistical life is constant across states (i.e., Vi* = V*), the 
estimated average value of the time saved per marginal fatality from an increased speed limit is   5
upward biased compared to what it would be for both adopters and non-adopters because the left 
hand side of equation (1) is only observed for adopters.
6 
 
4. Data and Econometric Methods 
 
Data Sources 
To conduct the analysis, we collected a data file on vehicle miles traveled (VMT), traffic 
fatalities, and vehicle speeds that covers the years 1982-1993 for urban and rural interstate 
highways and for rural arterial roads.  States were allowed to increase the speed limit to 65 mph 
on rural interstates.  They were prohibited from increasing the limit on the other two.  Since 
these other roads generally had speed limits of 55 mph in 1987 and design features that closely 
resemble those of rural interstates, these two road types provide an important source of intra-
state variation.
7     
VMT is readily available by state and road type from the Federal Highway 
Administration’s Highway Statistics.
8  Total fatalities by road type are available from the Fatal 
Accident Reporting System, which provides a census of all fatal vehicle crashes in the United 
States.  By contacting all state departments of transportation, we obtained speed data for 21 of 
the 40 states that increased rural interstate speed limits.  Thus, these 21 states along with the 




The equation used to estimate how individuals trade off time spent traveling against the 
probability of a fatality is:   
(3)  ln (Hours of Travel)srt = β ln (VMT)srt + θ ln (Fatalities)srt + υsrt, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 See especially Thaler and Rosen (1976). 
6 In this special case, E(Vi|Adoption) is greater than V*, the value of a statistical life that is common among both 
adopters and non-adopters. 
7 Both rural and urban interstate roads have multiple lanes, with traffic separated by direction and controlled access.  
Rural arterials generally have one lane in each direction, but they have wide lanes and shoulder lanes.  Access to 
them is less controlled than to interstates, but more than to any other type of road.  See National Research Council 
(1984).       
8 Highway Statistics, Table VM-2, Federal Highway Administration, various issues. 
9 See Greenstone (2002) and Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) for further details on the data and summary 
statistics.   6
where  υsrt = αsr + ηrt + µst + νsrt.  Here, s references state, r indicates roadtype, and t indexes 
year.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hours of travel (that is, the reciprocal of 
the average speed multiplied by VMT) and ln (VMT)srt, the natural logarithm of vehicle miles of 
travel, is a control.  Thus the parameter of interest, θ, measures the elasticity of time spent 
traveling with respect to fatalities, holding constant VMT. 
  There are a number of potential sources of bias that we can control with state, year, and 
roadtype dummy variables and many of their interactions.  Even with the inclusion of the 
multitude of fixed effects indicated in υsrt, however, θ is not robust to time varying state-roadtype 
determinants of fatalities.  As an example, it is possible that individuals drive more slowly when 
there is poor weather or heavy road repair precisely due to safety concerns.  Our solution to this 
identification problem is to find a variable that affects speeds and that only affects fatalities 
through its effect on speeds.  As Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) demonstrate, a plausible 




Table 1 reports results from the estimation of equation (3).  In column (1) the sample is 
limited to data from the rural interstate roads and the specification includes year-roadtype and 
state-roadtype fixed effects.  In column (2) the sample is enlarged to include observations on 
urban interstates and rural arterials, allowing for the addition of state-year indicators to the 
specification.  The first panel presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, 
while the second panel uses an indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force as an 
instrumental variable as outlined in the previous section.  For each regression, the table reports 
the parameter estimate on the fatalities variable and the heteroskedastic consistent standard error 
in parentheses.  The implied estimate of V, the monetary value of the time saved per marginal 
fatality, is calculated by multiplying the elasticity by the ratio of hours traveled to total fatalities 
on rural interstates in adopting states from 1982-86 (6.122 billion/5,187) and by the 1986 
average wage rate in adopting states ($12.33 in 1997$) and is presented in brackets. 
The OLS regressions indicate that speeds and fatalities are virtually uncorrelated.   
Although this may seems puzzling at first, it is not very surprising.  After all, people will choose   7
to travel more slowly in order to reduce the likelihood of a fatality when a road is unsafe (e.g., 
due to poor weather).   
The IV estimates paint a very different picture.  In particular, the two estimates of θIV 
indicate that a 10% increase in fatalities is associated with a 1% to 1.1% reduction in travel times 
and these estimates would be judged statistically significant by conventional criteria.  The 
similarity between the results in columns (1) and (2) indicates that in this setting state-year 
unobservables are not an important source of bias.  The associated estimate of the IV monetary 
value of time saved per marginal fatality is approximately $1.5 million (1997$).     
Overall, Table 1 has two primary findings.  First, the OLS results illustrate the difficulty 
of making causal inferences when there is no exogenous variability in the data.  In particular, the 
results in the top panel are consistent with the possibility that OLS will produce estimates of θ 
that are biased upwards due to individuals’ compensatory behavior.  Second, the use of the 
introduction of the 65-mph speed limit as an instrumental variable appears to mitigate this bias, if 
not entirely remove it.   
We now undertake separate analyses for each of the 21 adopting states.  Table 2 presents 
state-by-state estimates and standard errors of the IV elasticity between time saved and fatalities 
(cols. (1) and (2)) and the monetary value of time saved per marginal fatality (col. (3)).  These 
are obtained from fitting versions of equation (3) that include the logarithm of VMT interacted 
with roadtype and state-roadtype, roadtype-year, and state-year fixed effects as controls.  The 
sample for each of these regressions includes observations on rural interstates, urban interstates, 
and rural arterials from the 7 states that retained the 55 mph limit and the state for which the 
estimate applies.   
The entries reveal that 19 of the 21 IV elasticities have the expected negative sign.   
Notably, only 3 (Colorado, Iowa, and South Dakota) of the elasticities would be judged 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  The estimated value of time saved per marginal 
fatality ranges from -$1.12 million (Arkansas) to $9.71 million (Wisconsin).  As we report 
below, however, this enormous variability is entirely consistent with sampling error in the 
estimates. 
Figure 1 provides an opportunity to assess the extent of the variability in the estimates in 
the context of their precision.  It plots the state-specific estimated values of time saved per 
fatality on the y-axis against the t-statistics of the IV elasticities on the x-axis.  Each state is   8
denoted with its two letter abbreviation.  The letters “s” and “f” in parentheses indicate that the 
reduced form relationships between the instrument and hours spent traveling (i.e., the inverse of 
speed) and fatalities, conditional on the same set of covariates as the Table 2 specification, is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, respectively.  It is evident that the extreme estimates, both 
negative and positive, are the ones where the elasticity is estimated with the least precision.  For 
example, all of the estimates with associated t-statistics greater than 1.4 are in the relatively 
narrow range of $1.2 million to $3.2 million.  To more systematically assess the variability of 
these estimates, we implemented an F-test of the hypothesis that the 21 elasticities are equal and 
failed to reject the null (p-value = 0.24). 
  To explore what might happen if each state in our data were studied separately, with 
publication of each study determined by the standard peer-review process, we provide the 
analysis in Table 3.  Here, we consider each state-specific estimate of V a separate study that 
could have been undertaken by a researcher, submitted to a journal, and considered for 
publication by reviewers and the editor.
10  We further assume that the 21 adopting states with 
complete data form the universe of states that raised the speed limit.  The different panels report 
the weighted mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the Vi’s from alternative “publication 
rules,” where the weight is the inverse of the IV elasticity’s standard error.  Each of these rules 
leads to an estimate of V that is based on a different subsample of the universe of Vi’s. 
  The first panel reveals that the weighted average of all 21 state-specific estimates of V is 
$1.14 million.  This estimate serves as the basis of comparison for the alternative publication 
rules.  In the second panel, we impose the rule that to be published a study must have an IV 
elasticity with an associated p-value < .05.  This is believed to be a common basis for 
determining a study’s value.  Three of the estimates meet this criteria and their weighted average 
is $2.31. Thus, this publication rule produces an estimate of V that is more than twice as large as 
the one based on the universe of estimates.  This is especially notable in a setting where the 
hypothesis that the treatment effect is homogeneous cannot be rejected.  The third and fourth 
panels impose publication rules that require p-values < .05 for the reduced form relationships 
between the instrument and fatalities and speed, respectively.  They also produce upward biased 
estimates of V, although the bias is smaller.  
                                                           
10 In fact, there are numerous state-specific studies of the consequences of altered speed limits.  See NRC (1984) and 




This study has demonstrated that omitted variables and publication bias can lead to 
severely biased estimates of the monetary value of time saved per marginal fatality.  As a result, 
estimates of the value of a statistical life that do not account for these factors will also be 
severely biased.  Although our empirical results are obtained in the context of a study of choices 
about road safety, we suspect that the same issues plague the estimation of the value of a 



















   10
References 
 
Ashenfelter, Orley; Harmon, Colm and Oosterbeek, Hessel.  “A Review of Estimates of the 
Schooling/Earnings Relationship, with Tests for Publication Bias.”  Labour Economics, 
1999, 6(4): 453-70. 
 
Ashenfelter, Orley and Greenstone, Michael.  “Using Mandated Speed Limits to Measure the 
Value of a Statistical Life.”  Journal of Political Economy, 2004, forthcoming. 
 
Black, Dan A. and Kneisner, Thomas J.  “On the Measurement of Job Risk in Hedonic Wage 
Models.”  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, December 2003, 27(3): 205-20. 
 
Blomquist, Glenn C.  “Self Protection and Averting Behavior, Values of Statistical Lives, and 
Benefit Cost Analysis of Environmental Policy.”  Mimeo, University of Kentucky, 2001. 
 
Greenstone, Michael.  “A Reexamination of the Systemwide Effects of the 65 Mph Speed 
Limit.”  Economic Inquiry, 2002, 40(2): 271-8.   
 
Hedges, Larry V.  “Modeling Publication Selection Effects in Meta-Analysis.”  Statistical 
Science, 1992, 7(2): 246-55. 
 
Khan, Nisar; Kumares C. Sinha, and McCarthy, Patrick S.  An Analysis of Speed Limit Policies 
for Indiana.  West Lafayette, IN: Joint Transportation Research Project, Purdue 
University, 2000. 
 
National Research Council (U.S.) Transportation Research Board.  Fifty-five, a Decade of 
Experience.  Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984.   
   
Viscusi, W. Kip.  “The Value of Risks to Life and Health.”  Journal of Economic Literature, 
1993, 31: 1912–46. 
 
Thaler, Richard and Rosen, Sherwin.  “The Value of Saving a Life:  Evidence from the Labor 
Market,” in Nestor E. Terlecky, ed., Household Production and Consumption.  
Cambridge, MA: NBER, 1976: 265-98. 
 
U.S. Department of Transportation.  Effects of the 65 MPH Speed Limit through 1990: A Report 





   11
Table 1: Estimates of the Monetary Value of Time Saved per Marginal 
Fatality 
 
Sample  Rural Interstates   Rural Interstates, Urban Interstates, 
& Rural Arterials 
 (1)  (2) 
Ordinary Least Squares   -.003  .001 
 (.007)  (.003) 
  [$0.04 million]  [-$0.01 million] 
    
Instrumental Variables  -.113**  -.099** 
 (.034)  (.034) 
  [$1.64 million]  [$1.44 million] 
    
Year-Roadtype Indicators  Yes  Yes 
State-Roadtype Indicators  Yes  Yes 
State-Year Indicators  No  Yes 
 
Notes: Each set of entries reports the parameter on ln (Fatalities), its heteroskedastic-consistent standard error (in 
parentheses), and the associated monetary value of time saved per marginal fatality (in square brackets) from the 
fitting of different versions of equation (3).  In column (1) the sample includes observations on rural interstates from 
the 28 states with complete data.  In column (2) observations on urban interstates and rural arterials are added to the 
column (1) sample.  In each specification, ln (vehicle miles of travel) interacted with road type is included as a 
control.  The other controls are listed at the bottom of the table.  In the top panel, equation (3) is fit by ordinary least 
squares while in the second panel an indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force is an instrumental 
variable for ln (Fatalities).  See the text and Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) for further estimation details.  * 
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Table 2: State by State Estimates of Monetary Value of Time Saved 
per Marginal Fatality 
 
 IV  Elasticity 
 Parameter  Standard 
 Estimate  Error 
Estimated Value of 
Time Saved per Fatality 
Millions of 1997 $s 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Arizona -0.239  (.215)  $1.92 
Arkansas 0.094  (.072)  -$1.12 
California -0.431  (.403)  $4.75 
Colorado -0.212*  (.089)  $2.31 
Idaho -0.241  (.201)  $2.05 
Illinois -0.128  (.076)  $3.19 
Indiana -0.045  (.497)  $0.70 
Iowa -0.106*  (.053)  $2.97 
Kansas -0.113  (.077)  $1.96 
Kentucky -0.071  (.049)  $1.24 
Michigan -0.033  (.029)  $0.99 
Mississippi -0.079  (.120)  $0.76 
Nevada -0.082  (.098)  $0.49 
North Carolina  -0.061  (.035)  $1.09 
Ohio 0.013  (.027)  -$0.47 
Oregon -0.340  (.536)  $5.41 
South Carolina  -0.099  (.077)  $1.68 
South Dakota  -0.110*  (.049)  $1.92 
Tennessee -0.020  (.043)  $0.29 
Wisconsin -0.330  (.609)  $9.71 
Wyoming -0.055  (.088)  $0.50 
 
Notes: For each row the entries report the results from separate regressions where the sample includes observations 
on rural interstates, urban interstates, and rural arterials from the 7 states that retained the 55 mph limit and the state 
for which the estimate applies.  The specifications regress ln (Hours of Travel) on ln (Fatalities), and the controls are 
ln (vehicle miles of travel) interacted with roadtype and state-roadtype, roadtype-year, and state-year fixed effects.  
An indicator for whether the 65 mph speed limit was in force is an instrumental variable for ln (Fatalities).  Columns 
(1) and (2) report the parameter on ln (Fatalities) and its heteroskedastic-consistent standard error (in parentheses).  
Column (3) reports the estimated value of time saved per marginal fatality, which is calculated by multiplying the IV 
elasticity (column (1)) by the state-specific ratio of hours traveled to total fatalities and the state-specific mean 
hourly wage.  See the text and Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) for further estimation details.  * indicates 
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Table 3: Estimates of Monetary Value of Time Saved (1997$) per Marginal 
Fatality Based on State by State Estimates and Alternative Publication Rules 
 
Sample (1) 
















Notes: Each panels report the weighted mean and standard error (in parentheses) of the Vi’s from alternative 
“publication rules,” where the weight is the inverse of the IV elasticity’s standard error from Table 2.  See the text 
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